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Defendants and appellants submit the following reply to 
the Brief of Appellees: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
This subject is discussed in Point I of the Brief of 
Appellants and in Points II, III and IV of Appellees' Brief. 
Plaintiffs and Appellees (hereafter "plaintiffs") do not 
dispute the fact, nor indeed can they, that the District Court 
expressly found in Finding of Fact No. 6 in the District Court 
action (hereafter "First Case") that the subject Uniform Real 
Estate Contract had been "paid in full." Having been paid in full, 
there is nothing further owing under it. Defendants and Appellants 
(hereafter "defendants") respectfully submit that that issue can 
never be litigated again. Had the District Court said that the 
said contract was only paid up to a certain date, then plaintiffs 
might be free to allege, as they now attempt to do, that something 
further became due and owing thereunder at a later date. 
Furthermore, when the court in the First Case quieted 
title to the right-of-way in defendants, it made a determination 
that the contract was paid in full (even if there had not been a 
finding in paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact) because the 
defendants were not entitled to have title quieted in them in the 
right-of-way or any other portion of the property until they had 
paid the contract in full, including principal, interest, taxes, 
water assessments and any other amounts whatever. 
The plaintiffs attempt to circumvent the foregoing 
inescapable conclusion by arguing that they hadn't yet paid said 
alleged back taxes for the years 1989, '90 and '91, and that 
therefore nothing was owing to them yet. Plaintiffs state at page 
18 of their brief: 
"Similarly, in the present case the District Court's 
statement that the contract had been 'paid in full' did 
not speak to obligations of the Josephsons that had not 
yet arisen nor entitled them to avoid these obligations 
when they matured." 
Since the issue of the balance owing under the said 
contract was tried and adjudicated in the First Case, this 
precludes any further inquiry into any amounts owing under the 
contract by reason of the doctrines of res judicata or collateral 
estoppel, at least unless and until that Judgment is set aside 
under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Even if the issue of taxes had not been tried, it could 
have been tried, and is therefore barred in any event under the 
said doctrines in accordance with the decision of our Supreme Court 
in Schaer v. State by & Through Dept. of Transportation. 657 P2d 
1337 (Utah 1983) , which we cite in our original brief. In that 
case the court stated at page 1340: ". . . and this precludes the 
relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as well 
as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action . . ." 
Plaintiffs claim that they could not have made a claim 
for the said taxes in the First Case because they had not yet paid 
them as of the time the said Judgment was entered. That position 
is totally erroneous. The Uniform Real Estate Contracts provides 
at paragraph 12 that: "The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes 
after 5-4-73." 
And the said contract provides in paragraph 14 as 
follows: 
"In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment 
of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his 
option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance 
premiums or either of them, and if Seller elects so to 
do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon 
demand, all such sums so advanced and paid by him, 
together with interest thereon from date of payment of 
said sums at the rate of 3/4 of one percent per month 
until paid." 
It is clear therefore that plaintiffs had no obligation 
to pay the taxes, but were entitled to do so if they desired. 
However that may be, plaintiffs were entitled to force defendants 
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to pay the taxes and assessments by proceeding under the provisions 
of paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, if in fact any 
taxes or assessments were due and owing at the time of the District 
Court Judgment. Certainly, if taxes and assessments were owing, 
plaintiffs could have proved at trial such fact of nonpayment, 
which if believed by the court would have precluded the court from 
quieting the title in defendants, because payment in full of the 
contract is a condition precedent to conveyance of the property 
from seller to buyer under paragraph 19 of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. Plaintiffs do not have to pay the taxes and assessments 
to assert nonpayment thereof as a good defense to defendants7 right 
to have title quieted in defendants. 
The amount of arrears of taxes and assessments, if any, 
was subject to being proved in the First Case, including interest 
and penalties, and the court could have apportioned such taxes (if 
there were any) between the parties. Plaintiffs could then have 
been afforded complete relief in the First Case for any unpaid 
taxes and assessments by refusal of the District Court to quiet 
title, or by ordering the Josephsons to pay the required amount of 
taxes to the plaintiffs or to the county directly as ci condition to 
quieting title in them or, as noted above, the court could have 
allowed plaintiffs to foreclose under the aforesaid paragraph 16 
for breach of contract. 
But in either event, nonpayment of taxes and assessments 
was fully assertable by plaintiffs in the First Case as a complete 
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bar to the relief sought by defendants in that case. To claim 
nonpayment of the taxes by plaintiffs as an excuse for losing on 
that issue in the First Case, or even as an excuse for not raising 
the issue in the First Case, is totally without merit. 
Plaintiffs state at page 13 of their brief that: 
"The Covingtons did not dispute the Josephsons/ 
claim that they had paid all amounts owed to the 
Covingtons under the contract and had no claim against 
the Josephsons until they were forced to pay the taxes 
and assessments in order to sell their remaining 
property." 
It appears that this admission settles the matter. Even 
if the plaintiffs believed that they did not have a claim against 
the Josephsons for back taxes and assessments until plaintiffs 
actually paid the alleged taxes, that does not help them because 
that is not the law, and their mistake as to the law does not bar 
the application of the doctrines of res judicata or collateral 
estoppel. 
The plaintiffs also cite the case of Schaer v. State By 
and Through Department of Transportationf supra, because the court 
in that case stated that the findings "did not purport to rule 
conclusively on the status of the Dugway road 'for all time.'" 
In the instant case, however, when the District Court 
made a ruling that the contract was "paid in full," the court 
clearly intended to make a determination that the contract was paid 
in full for all time. Otherwise, res judicata is a useless 
doctrine. If the contract has not been paid, the defendants were 
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not entitled to conveyance. If the defendants got a conveyance, it 
was because they paid the contract. 
Plaintiffs also cite Macintosh v. Hampshire. 832 P2d 1298 
(Utah App. 1992) . In that case the first trial involved an action 
for slander of title caused by notice of interest that had been 
filed against the property by Macintosh. Macintosh counterclaimed, 
asserting that he had 10% interest in the land due to an oral 
agreement. In the second trial Macintosh no longer claimed that he 
had an interest in the property, but alleged that he had monetary 
compensation coming, which is a totally different claim. No such 
distinction exists in this case, however, and Macintosh has no 
relevance here. The Uniform Real Estate Contract is not "paid in 
full" until all sums—principal, interest, taxes and assessments— 
have been paid. Plaintiffs' claim for any taxes or assessments is 
necessarily encompassed in any determination that the contract is 
"paid in full." 
Likewise, the case of Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. , 635 
P2d 417 (Utah 1981), cited by plaintiffs, is inapplicable to this 
case because the second case there involved a matter which was 
clearly not even touched upon in the first action. The first 
action involved lost wages, and the second case involved the issue 
of disability, not lost wages. 
POINT II. THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT IS NOT 
SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK IN THE CIRCUIT COURT. 
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This subject matter is dealt with at Point II of 
Appellants' Brief and in Point I of the Brief of Appellees. 
Plaintiffs7 sole defense to this point is the allegation 
that this issue was allegedly not raised in the lower court and is 
therefore precluded from consideration on appeal. 
The plaintiffs are in error in this assertion. 
Pointing out the Judgment is not subject to collateral 
attack, particularly in a lower court, is the defense of res 
judicata or collateral estoppel looked at from a slightly different 
perspective, but it is basically the same rule. 
If res judicata or collateral estoppel apply, as we 
believe they do, then that is the end of the matter. Plaintiffs, 
however, attempt to circumvent said doctrines by asking the Circuit 
Court to go behind the District Court Judgment to find that the 
issues of taxes and water assessment was in effect "reserved" by an 
alleged stipulation of the parties. The District Court Judgment 
does not reserve such issue within the four corners of the 
document, and the lower court cannot collaterally attack the 
District Court Judgment to avoid application of the doctrines of 
res judicata or collateral estoppel. To allow another court, 
particularly a lower court, to do that is to in effect nullify the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and therefore 
the rule that precludes such collateral attack is a necessary and 
integral part of said doctrines. 
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Furthermore, the Third Defense to defendants' Answer 
states: 
"Plaintiffs' Complaint is barred by the principles 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and the Final 
Judgment in the case of 'The Estate of Douglas B. 
Covington, by and through its Co-Personal 
Representatives, Robert H. Covington and Mary C, Whetman, 
Plaintiff, vs. John C. and Geraldine C. Josephson, 
Defendants,' Civil No. C-89-3339, entered in this action 
on or about December 18, 1991, bars this action in its 
entirety." 
A fair reading of that defense demonstrates that 
defendants are asserting that the earlier Judgment is a bar to this 
action, including, but not limited to application of the doctrines 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The said Third Defense is 
framed in two independent clauses. The first asserts that 
plaintiffs' Complaint is barred by the two enumerated principles of 
law, to-wit: res judicate and collateral estoppel, and the second 
clause asserts that the final Judgment "bars this action in its 
entirety." (Even plaintiffs admit that these clauses are separate 
defenses in their Memorandum found at R. 109 and 110.) We submit 
that the second clause is sufficiently broad to cover defendants' 
assertion that collateral attack is improper in this case. 
The rule that issues not raised below will not be 
considered on appeal is subject to numerous exceptions in any 
event, and in order for it to be properly applied the reasons for 
the rule must be examined. The principal reason for the rule is 
that if an issue is not raised in the court below, but rather is 
raised for the first time on appeal, the opposing party is 
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precluded from presenting evidence which might have refuted the 
theory, had the opposing party been given notice thereof. The 
reasons for the rule are therefore primarily based upon "facts" and 
not upon reasons. 
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error, Section 546, states in 
relevant part: 
"The rule requiring adherence to the theory relied 
on below does not mean that the parties are limited in 
the appellate court to the same reasons or arguments 
advanced in the lower court upon the matter or question 
in issue." 
See Dewey v. Pes Moines, 173 US 193, 43 L Ed 665, 19 Sup 
Ct 379, (1899) . 
Summary judgment is only proper if there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, and plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law, and "Such showing must preclude, as a matter of 
law, all reasonable possibility that the loser could win if given 
a trial." See Judkins v. Toone. 27 Ut 2d 17, 492 P2d 980 (1972), 
at page 983. In so determining, all facts and inferences must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to defendants. By definition 
the plaintiffs cannot have been harmed factually by any legitimate 
argument of law made in this court because plaintiffs are moving 
parties on the Summary Judgment which was granted below, and they 
cannot claim that they have been hurt in any way by not being 
allowed to introduce factual matters in the court below. All 
material facts presented by them by affidavit were countered by 
defendant's Affidavit. Furthermore, plaintiffs had the duty to 
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come forward with "facts" before defendants were ever required to 
respond. 
The defendants have clearly asserted that the prior final 
Judgment precludes plaintiffs' recovery, and defendants are 
entitled to argue any legal basis for that assertion. 
At 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error, Section 548, it states: 
"Questions necessarily involved in issues raised and 
litigated in the trial court are open for consideration 
on appeal or review, even though they were not 
specifically raised below. 
The degree to which the final Judgment precludes other 
courts, inferior or of equal rank, from in effect overruling the 
prior Judgment is necessarily a part of the assertion that the 
Judgment is a bar to plaintiffs' action. 
It appears clear that the Circuit Court does not have 
jurisdiction to change or modify the decision of the District 
Court. In numerous cases our Supreme Court has held that the 
decision of a District Court judge is not subject to modification 
by another District Court judge. See Peterson v. Peterson. 530 P2d 
821 (Utah 1974); Peav v. Peav. 607 P2d 841 (Utah 1980); In re 
Mecham, 537 P2d 312 (Utah 1975); Johnson v.Johnson, 560 P2d 1132 
(Utah 1977); and State v. Morgan 527 P2d 225 (Utah 1974). 
The reasoning of those cases is even more compelling when 
a Circuit Court judge attempts to in effect overrule the decision 
of the District Court. 
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This rule is so fundamental that it would appear to be a 
jurisdictional one, and of course Rule 12(h)(2), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, provides that lack of jurisdiction of the subject 
matter can be raised at any time. 
Likewise, 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error, Section 549, 
states: 
"A reviewing court may consider questions raised for 
the first time on appeal if necessary to serve the ends 
of substantial justice or prevent the denial of 
substantial rights." 
In Geis v. Continental Oil Co., 29 Ut 2nd 452, 511 P2d 
725 (Utah 1973), our Supreme Court ruled that a private claim 
cannot be based upon a transaction prohibited by law, although it 
was apparent that that issue was not raised in the court below. 
(See particularly dissenting opinion of Judge Crockett at page 
456.) 
For the foregoing reasons, the issue of the impropriety 
of allowing a collateral attack upon the District Court Judgment is 
entitled to full consideration by this court. 
POINT III. THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, HAVING 
BEEN FOUND TO HAVE BEEN PAID IN FULL BY THE DISTRICT COURT, IS 
TERMINATED AND NO LONGER AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR TAXES, 
WATER ASSESSMENT OR ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Plaintiffs' only defense to this point (see Point I of 
appellees' brief), which appears as Point III in Josephsons' 
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original brief, is that it was not raised in the lower court. This 
is not so. 
First of all, Josephsons deny in their Answer that any 
sum is due or owing. See paragraph 6 of defendants7 Answer (R.13) . 
Second, defendants allege in their Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment that the 
contract has been paid in full, and defendant, John C. Josephson, 
alleges in paragraphs 2 and 4 of his Affidavit (R. 47, 48) that no 
sum is due or owing. If the contract has been paid in full, then 
it follows that nothing is owing thereunder, and the discussion in 
defendants' Point III is merely an explanation of the reasoning 
behind that assertion, which was clearly made in the lower court. 
Third, the defendants spelled out in detail their 
contention that the contract was terminated and/or merged in the 
earlier Judgment in their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter 
and Amend Judgment (R. 133, 137), The said document is set forth 
in its entirety in the Appendix hereto. 
This issue was thus clearly raised in the lower court. 
Even if this were not so, the arguments set forth in 
connection with Point II would be equally applicable here. 
POINT IV. AT THE VERY LEAST, FACTUAL ISSUES EXIST AS 
RAISED BY THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE PARTIES. 
This matter is discussed at Point IV of Josephsons' 
original brief and is discussed in Points V and VI of appellees' 
brief and referred to in Point I thereof. 
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These are disputed issues of fact. These disputed facts 
appear from the Affidavits of John C. Josephson (R. 47 and 48) and 
from the second Affidavit of John C. Josephson (R. 141 and 142), 
which is included in teh Appendix hereto, from the Affidavit of 
David K. Broadbent (R. 63), and from the Affidavit of Mary Whetman 
(R. 72), all of which were before the court and were of necessity 
considered by the court. These Affidavits are in conflict and raise 
the following issues of fact: 
A. Was the contract paid in full? Plaintiffs say it 
was not (Affidavit of Mary Whetman R. 74), and defendant, John C. 
Josephson says it was (Affidavit of John C. Josephson R. 47 and 
48). Mr. Josephson states in paragraph 1 of his Affidavit: ". . 
. I fully performed all of my duties under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract." (R. 47.) This presents a factual issue at the very 
least. 
B. Plaintiffs assert that the issue of taxes and water 
assessment was by stipulation excluded from the trial. See 
Affidavit of David Broadbent (R. 63) and Affidavit of Mary Whetman 
(R. 74) . Defendant, John C. Josephson, says there was no such 
stipulation entered into and no such reservation made, and he 
asserts that the issue of taxes and assessments was tried. See 
Affidavit of John C. Josephson (R. 47 and 48 and 141 and 142). We 
may rest assured that if the transcript of the District Court case 
disclosed any stipulation for reservation, plaintiffs would have 
produced it. Since it was not produced, the presumption is that it 
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does not exist. At paragraph 4 of Mr. Josephson's first Affidavit 
he says: " . . . I further state that my Answer filed in this 
action alleged full performance of the contract by me, and 
plaintiffs' Reply denied such performance, and that issue was 
directly tried by the District Court . . . " (R. 47.) 
Mr. Josephson stated in his second Affidavit (R. 141 and 
142) at paragraph 2: 
"That I was in attendance during the whole trial in 
the prior action between the parties above-named in Third 
District Court, Civil No. C-89-3339. No Stipulation was 
ever entered into regarding real property taxes or water 
or other assessments by me or my attorney with counsel 
for the Plaintiffs at any time during the course of the 
trial." 
Any such reservation should have been set forth in the 
Judgment. It was not because it was not the fact, and defendant, 
John C. Josephson, asserts that said issue was not so reserved. At 
the very least, there is an issue of fact here. 
These factual issues were also fully addressed in 
defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter and Amend (R. 
134, 135 and 136). 
The issue of the supposed reservation of the issue of 
taxes and assessments at the trial pursuant to stipulation of the 
parties is particularly important because it is obvious that the 
trial court apparently felt that that alleged fact was conclusively 
established, notwithstanding the denial contained in Mr. 
Josephson7s aforesaid Affidavit. 
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Judge Reese has included his notes at pages 58 and 59 of 
the record where he states, "Prior litigation Dist Ct did not 
address issues of these taxes and water fees paid." And, again, 
"Defs attorney in prior litigation agreed to pay taxes and water 
assessments-never disputed obligation (See Cummings letter)" and 
also: "Issue of taxes/water fees not litigated," 
It is entirely improper for the trial court to choose 
between two conflicting affidavits on a motion for summary 
judgment. If it were even proper for Judge Reese to consider 
matters outside of the record regarding the District Court trial, 
he certainly could not do so without hearing all the evidence 
bearing thereon at a factual hearing where there are conflicting 
affidavits. 
C. The other issue of fact is that of the 
reasonableness of attorney's fees. As noted in our original brief, 
these were adjudicated without a hearing and without a finding of 
reasonableness. A judgment granted without a hearing is 
jurisdictionally flawed and is void, and the lack of jurisdiction 
can be raised at any time. Nevertheless, this issue was raised at 
page 6 of defendants' said Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter 
and Amend (R. 138), which is the only place it could be raised. 
Plaintiffs attempt to justify this lack of due process by 
reference to Rule 4-505, Code of Judicial Administration. It 
appears clear that Rule 4-505 was intended to apply primarily to 
default cases and perhaps also to cases in which the parties agree 
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that the matter of attorney's fees shall be handled on affidavits. 
The present case is not a default case, nor did the parties agree 
to handle the matter of attorney's fees on affidavit. It is clear 
that in contested cases Rule 4-505 was never intended to supersede 
the requirements of the line of cases exemplified by Provo City 
Corp. v. Cropper, 28 Ut 2nd 1, 497 P2d 629 (1972), which make it 
clear that in contested cases involving attorney's fees the court 
must take evidence and make findings as to the reasonableness of 
the fees. 
POINT V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
This matter was discussed as Point V of defendants' 
original brief and is not discussed in the brief of appellees, so 
no reply is necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Summary Judgment awarded 
in favor or plaintiffs and against defendants should be reversed, 
and defendants' Summary Judgment granted, or at the very least, the 
matter should be remanded for trial on the said issues of fact. 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
A copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants was 
mailed to David K. Broadbent and Thomas M. Melton, attorneys for 
the plaintiffs and appellees, at their address, 175 East 400 South, 
#900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, the 
day of February, 1994. 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
Document Page of Record 
Docket of Third Circuit Court . . . . (attached to front 
cover of Record 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 105 
Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Alter or Amend Judgment 133 
Affidavit of John Josephson 141 
-18-
D O C K E T 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC 
Case : 920009436 CV Civil 
Case Title: 
Page 1 
MONDAY JUNE 7, 1993 
2:36 PM 
Filing Date: 07/07/92 
Judge: Robin W. Reese 
THE ESTATE OF COUGLAS B COVINGTON VS JOSEPHSON, JOHN C 
Cause of Action: 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Amount of Suit.: $3500.00 
Return Date....: 
Judgment : SJ Summary Judgment Date: 02/11/93 Amt: $10070.30 
Disposition....: Date: 
Court Set: ORAL ARGUMENT on 01/04/93 at 0200 P in room ? with RWR 
No Tracking Activity. 
No Accounts Payable Activity. 
Transaction: Date: Cash-in Check-in Check-out Total 
Civil File Fee 07/07/92 .00 40.00 .00 40.00 
Civil File Fee 05/20/93 .00 160.00 .00 160.00 
Party..: PLA Plaintiff 
Name...: 
THE ESTATE OF COUGLAS B COVING 
TON 
Party..: DEF Defendant 
Name...: 
JOSEPHSON, JOHN C 
D O C K E T Page 2 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC MONDAY JUNE 7, 1993 
2:36 PM 
Case : 920009436 CV Civil Filing Date: 07/07/92 
Case Title: Judge: Robin W. Reese 
THE ESTATE OF COUGLAS B COVINGTON VS JOSEPHSON, JOHN C 
Party,.: DEF Defendant 
Name...: 
JOSEPHSON, GERALDINE C 
Party..: ATP Atty for Plaintiff 
Name...: 
BROADBENT, DAVID K 
07/07/92 Case filed on 07/07/92. SLA 
Began tracking Return Date Review on 01/04/93 SLA 
921290280 Civil complaint fee 40.00 KJR 
I 07/28/92 FILED SUMMONS ON RETURN - SERVED GERALDINE C JOSEPHSON MJB 
I FILED SUMMONS ON RETURN - SERVED JOHN JOSEPHSON BY LEAVING WITH MJB 
I WIFE MJB 
08/12/92 FILED ANSWER FROM DEFT'S ATTY (ATD GORDON A MADSEN) SLA 
I 09/25/92 FILED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT KHB 
I FILED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY KHB 
I JUDGMENT KHB 
I 10/22/92 FILED DEF AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR KHB 
I SUMMARY JUDGMENT KHB 
I FILED DEF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR KHB 
I SUMMARY JUDGMENT KHB 
I FILED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ALS 
I 12/21/92 FILED REQUEST FOR RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. KHB 
12/24/92 JUDGE REESE REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENTS HEARING BE SET FOR MONDAY KHB 
JAN 4, 1993 AT 2:00 PM. KHB 
CLERK CLEARED DATE WITH ATTY. BROADHEAD, ATP. KHB 
ARG scheduled for 1/ 4/93 at 2:00 P in room ? with R;;R KHB 
CLERK MAILED NOTICE OF HEARING TO BOTH ATP AND ATD. KHB 
I 12/3 0/92 FILED REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY KHB 
I JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR KHB 
I SUMMARY JUDGMENT. KHB 
01/04/93 ORAL ARGUMENT - Event No. 001 MJD 
Judge: RWR Reporter: MARLENE DAZLEY MJD 
This matter was settled on: 01/04/93 MJD 
Attorney for plaintiff present Attorney for defendant present MJD 
PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMI1ARY JUDGMENT / C/O MOTION GRANTED MJD 
C/O CROSS MOTION DENIED MJD 
PLAINTIFFS ATTORNEY TO PREPARE AFFIDAVIT FOR ATTORNEY FEES MJD 
D O C K E T Page 3 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC MONDAY JUNE 7, 1993 
2:36 PM 
Case : 920009436 CV Civil Filing Date: 07/07/92 
Case Title: Judge: Robin W. Reese 
THE ESTATE OF COUGLAS B COVINGTON VS JOSEPHSON, JOHN C 
01/04/93 OBJECTION TO BE FILED IN 10 DAYS MJD 
01/19/93 Return Date Review date changed to 03/15/93 KHB 
01/25/93 FILED AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. KHB 
I 02/05/93 FILED MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT PKB 
I FILED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT PKB 
I FILED AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN JOSEPHSON PKB 
I 02/11/93 NO OBJECTION HAVING BEEN FILED TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT, KHB 
I JUDGE REESE SIGNS SUMMARY JUDGMENT. KHB 
I Case judgment is Summary Judgment AMT: 10,070.30 KHB 
I Case removed from TRACKING KHB 
I CLERK ENTERS SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF: KHB 
I 3 370.70 PRINCIPAL KHB 
I 131.40 COSTS KHB 
I 3127.50 ATTY FEES KHB 
I 3440.70 INTEREST KHB 
I 10,070.3 0 TOTAL JUDGMENT PLUS INTEREST AT RATE OF 12% UNTIL KHB 
I PAID. KHB 
I 02/17/93 FILED MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT. KHB 
I FILED AFFIDAVIT. KHB 
I FILED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. KHB 
I 02/1S/93 FILED PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION KHB 
I TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT. KHB 
I 03/25/93 FILED NOTICE TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION. KHB 
I 04/07/93 JUDGE REESE DENIES PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND KHB 
I COMPLAINT. KHB 
04/08/93 **CLERK NOTIFIED PARTIES BY MAILING COPY OF DOCKET ENTRY** KHB 
I 04/2 0/93 JUDGE REESE ENTERS ORDER THAT DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO ALTER OR KHB 
I AMEND JUDGMENT IS DENIED. KHB 
05/20/93 FILED NOTICE OF APPEAL BMC 
FILED BOND FOR COSTS ON APPEAL BMC 
930950309 Notice of appeal fee 160.00 BMC 
I 05/21/93 FILED SUPERSEDEAS BOND. KHB 
I FILED APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND ORDER. KHB 
I JUDGE REESE ENTERS ORDER FOR SUPERSEDEAS BOND IN THE AMOUNT OF: KHB 
I $10,000.00 KHB 
06/07/93 SENT CERTIFIED COPY OF NOTICE OF APPEAL, BOND FOR COSTS ON CPN 
APPEAL, SUPERSEDEAS BOND, APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF CPN 
SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND ORDER AND SUPERSEDEAS BOND TO THE COURT OF CPN 
APPEALS CPN 
End of the docket report for this case. 
Gordon A. Madsen #2048 
Attorney for Defendants 
1130 West Center Street 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
Telephone: (801) 298-6610 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B. 
COVINGTON, by and through it's 
Co-Personal Representatives, 




JOHN C. and GERALDINE C. 
JOSEPHSON, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920009436CV 
Judge: Robin W. Reese 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, 
Gordon A. Madsen, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 59, URCP 
submits the following in support of their Motion to Alter or Amend. 
The Summary Judgment entered herein is defective on two 
grounds: First, Res Judicata applies, and second, the contract on 
which Judgment was granted was abrogated or subsumed by the 
Judgment in the Third District Court action between these same 
parties (Civil No. C-89-3339). 
In addition to the cases and hornbook law cited in 
Defendants' prior Memorandum opposing Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the undersigned calls the court's attention to 
the following: 
AmJur 2d Judgments paragraph 419 states: 
"When the second suit is between the same 
parties as the first, and on the same cause of 
action, the judgment in the former is 
conclusive of the latter, not only as to every 
question which was decided, but also as to 
every other matter which the parties might 
have litigated and had determined, within the 
issues as they were made or tendered by the 
pleadings, whether the same, as a matter of 
fact, were or were not considered. 
"As far as subsequent proceedings under a 
different cause of action ar concerned, the 
doctrine of res judicata is held not to apply 
to issues raised in the previous case which 
were not passed on by the court or jury in 
deciding it. Hence, the doctrine of res 
judicata does not preclude relitigation of an 
issue raised by the pleadings in the former 
action, but withdrawn or withheld from the 
consideration of the court or of the jury/ 
either by stipulation of the parties or 
otherwise. Likewise a judgment is not res 
judicata as to any matters which a court 
expressly refused to determine, and which it 
reserved for future consideration, or which it 
directed to be litigated in another forum or 
in another action. However, the mere fact 
that the court omits reference to a particular 
matter put in issue does not necessarily 
indicate that it was not decided, so as to 
preclude its judgment from operating as res 
judicata with respect thereto, since the 
judgment may be construed to settle all the 
issues by implication. 46 AmJur 2d 588-9 
(emphasis added) 
As noted in our former Memorandum, the issue of Defendants' 
performance under the contract was expressly plead in Defendants' 
Answer and Counterclaim and expressly denied in Plaintiffs' Reply, 
and Judge Moffat expressly found that Defendants had fully 
performed. Accordingly the question of payment of property taxes 
and water assessments were matters "which the parties might have 
litigated and had determined, within the issues as they were made 
or tendered by the pleadings, whether the same, as a matter of 
fact, were or were not considered." 
The Ohio case of State ex rel. Brophv v. City of Lakewood, et 
al. , 139 Ohio St. 633; 41 NE 2d 856 (1942) seems directly on point. 
The original suit was a Mandamus action seeking to compel the 
Defendant municipality to require it to restore a certain sum to 
the water fund from the general fund. The second action sought to 
amend the Judgment of the first action to add interest to the sum 
ordered restored. The Ohio Supreme Court held: 
"The same issue here presented was before 
this court in the case of the City of Lakewood 
v. Rees, supra. The jurisdiction of the court 
extended to interest on the fund, if any was 
due, as it did to the status of the fund 
itself. If any interest was recoverable it 
was due and owing up to the time of the decree 
of this court. That case, which was an action 
in remr is res judicata not only as to all 
issues decided/ but as to all issues which the 
court might have decided and as to all persons 
having an interest in the subject matter. 
There was no decree for interest and that 
determination was final." (emphasis added) 
It is to be noted that the action at bar is one "in rem" 
relating to real property. The taxes and water assessments due, if 
any, were due "up to the time of the [judgment] decree" of the 
Third District Court, and cannot be said to have accrued after that 
time, as counsel for Plaintiffs argued. They were paid after the 
judgment, but the cause of action had ripened prior thereto, and 
could have been decided in that action, and were not. Res 
Judicata. 
Counsel for Plaintiffs argued in this matter by his Reply 
Brief with supporting Affidavits that res judicata does not apply 
because there was what amounts (by his estimation) to a Stipulation 
exempting or removing the issue of taxes and water assessments from 
consideration by the District Court. The Affidavit claiming the 
/ ? / 
existence of such "stipulation" was not timely filed herein and was 
objected to by the undersigned because we didn't have opportunity 
to respond thereto. The Affidavit of John Josephson, attached 
hereto, categorically denies that any such Stipulation was entered 
into during the trial in District Court, if Plaintiffs' untimely 
Affidavits are to be considered, then the attached Affidavit must 
also be considered. The Affidavits, opposing each other, thus at 
the very least, create a material issue of fact which precludes 
Summary Judgment for Plaintiff herein. 
Plaintiff's counsel also attached to their Affidavits a letter 
from Robert C. Cummings, Defendants' attorney in the District Court 
action, dated after the Judgment, which Plaintiffs' counsel claimed 
was evidence of the supposed "stipulation." It is no such thing. 
On reading it again, the court will conclude that at best, it is an 
acknowledgement that a claim for taxes has been received, and 
forwarded to his clients, who are out of town, with a statement 
that a response will be forthcoming upon their return. Nothing 
more. No reference to any supposed stipulation, and the document 
could hardly be a new contract giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims. 
That document could not possibly be construed to be a sufficient 
writing to escape the Statute of Frauds requirements relating to 
transactions involving interests in real property. 
The second reason for Altering or Amending the Judgment by 
vacating the same is that the original action was one seeking to 
Quiet Title, an action in rem. Our statute (78-40) provides at 
section 13: "...The judgment shall be conclusive against all the 
persons named in the summons and complaint who have been served and 
against all such unknown persons as stated in the complaint and 
summons who have been served by publication." In short the 
Judgment of the court subsumes and abrogates all interests of 
claimants whether founded in contract, deed, lien or inchoate 
claims, etc. Had a deed been given in fulfillment of the fully 
performed contract, the contract would be deemed merged into the 
deed. The doctrine of "merger" that applies to deeds and contracts 
(earnest money or otherwise) applies here because the District 
Court's Judgment took the place of a deed. 
The doctrine of merger was relied on by Plaintiff's counsel in 
the prior District Court action, and is, therefore familiar to him. 
We quote from his brief filed in the District Court action: 
"2. All Contemporaneous Agreements are Merged 
Into the Warranty Deed. 
"Utah Courts recognize the doctrine of merger. Secor v. 
Knight, 716 P 2d 790 (Utah 1986). In Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P 2d 
168 (Utah 1977), the court explained the doctrine: 
'The doctrine of merger, which this Court 
recognizes, is applicable when the acts to be 
performed by the seller in a contract relate 
only to the delivery of title to the buyei:. 
Execution and delivery of a deed by the 
seller then usually constitutes full 
performance on his part, and acceptance of the 
deed by the buyer manifests his acceptance of 
that performance even though the estate 
conveyed may differ from that promised in the 
antecedent agreement. Therefore, in such a 
case, the deed is the final agreement and all 
prior terms, whether written or verbal, are 
extinguished and unenforceable. Ml (emphasis 
added) 
Since the Judgment in the District Court conveyed title to 
Defendants and was the final disposition of the rights of the 
parties under the contract there disputed, particularly where the 
court made an express finding of full performance by Defendants, 
constitutes a merger and "final agreement" and the prior contract 
is "extinguished and unenforceable." Accordingly there is no 
contract surviving the District Court Judgment on which Plaintiffs 
may in this action base a claim for taxes, water assessments. And 
obviously, as well, there is no surviving contract upon which 
Plaintiffs can maintain a claim for attorneys fees. 
Although awarding an attorney's fee upwards of $3,000.00 for 
collection of upwards of $3,000.00 is totally unreasonable, we are 
not obliged to consider reasonableness, herein because there is no 
basis in contract or law herein to award attorneys fees. 
The merger doctrine is analogous to the holding regarding 
recision found in BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, 586 P 2d 456 (Utah, 
1978). In that action, the Defendants were allowed to rescind a 
contract for the purchase of a ranch, and in their cross-appeal 
claimed that the court below erred in not granting them attorneys 
fees as provided in the contract. Justice Hall speaking for the 
court said: 
"Finally, Pattersons contend that the 
trial court erred in denying their request for 
attorney fees. This was not error. Their 
claim for attorney fees is based upon a 
provision in the contract of sale. By asking 
for recision of the contract, they disaffirmed 
it in its entirety. They may not avoid the 
contract and, at the same time, claim the 
benefit of the provision for attorney fees." 
(p. 458) 
More directly on point under the "merger" doctrine is the case 
of Kelsey v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 226; 419 P 2d 198 (Utah 1966). In 
that action a certain Hansen (a real estate broker) and Boyer 
/ 
(Hansen's sales agent) jointly signed an Earnest Money Agreement to 
buy a fourplex from Plaintiff Kelsey. The agreement provided that 
the buyers would pay for certain "extras"--drapes, etc. When the 
Deed was executed, Hansen was the sole Grantee. No mention was 
made in the Deed about the "extras." Kelsey then sued Boyer and 
Hansen under the Earnest Money Agreement for payment of the 
"extras." The court held: 
"The theory is that the deed to Hansen 
was not decisive of Boyer's commitment to buy 
and pay extras. We think it was, and that a 
merger resulted, especially since the Earnest 
Money Receipt also said that 'it is further 
agreed that execution of the final contract 
shall abrogate this Earnest Money Receipt.' 
We have difficulty in seeing why a warranty 
deed to Hansen should not abrogate the 
preliminary, loosely drawn and almost 
incoherent Earnest Money Receipt, and thus 
merge what really amounted only to signed 
notes of a contemplated future transaction for 
a deed, voluntarily executed, subject to and 
actually recorded under conceded recording 
procedures, which was accomplished and 
sanctioned by legislative authority." 
It follows, by analogy, that whatever claims were or could 
have been made in Third District Court were conclusively disposed 
of, merged and abrogated by the Judgment in that action, and there 
is no contract surviving that action left to Plaintiffs on which 
they can proceed in this court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Court should Alter and Amend the 
Summary Judgment heretofore entered herein, by vacating the same 
and granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, or at the 
most setting a trial to determine the narrow and sole issue of 
whether in fact a stipulation occurred in District Court that would 
provide a basis to take this action out from under the doctrines of 
merger and res judicata. 
Dated this 3 clay of February, 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/ ^ ^ "^  
~tj~&*i 
Madsen, Attorney for 
fendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion to 
David K. Broadbent and Thomas M. Melton, attorneys for Plaintiffs, 
at their address, City Centre I, Suite 900, 175 East Fourth South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 3rd day of February, 1993. 
Gordon A. Madsen #2048 
Attorney for Defendants 
1130 West Center Street 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
Telephone: (801) 298-6610 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B. 
COVINGTON, by and through it's 
Co-Personal Representatives, 




JOHN C. and GERALDINE C. 
JOSEPHSON, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN JOSEPHSON 
Civil No. 920009436CV 
Judge: Robin W. Reese 
) 
) ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
JOHN C. JOSEPHSON, upon his oath deposes and says: 
1. That I am one of the Defendants named in the above-
entitled action, and aver the facts set out below from my own 
direct knowledge. 
2. That I was in attendance during the whole trial in 
the prior action between the parties above-named in Third District 
Court, Civil No. C-89-3339. No Stipulation was ever entered into 
regarding real property taxes or water or other assessments by me 
or my attorney with counsel for the Plaintiffs at any time during 
the course of the trial. 
K\ 
AFFIANT 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public this 





CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Affidavit 
t <;.) D a v i (:1 K B 2: o a db e n t a i:i d T3:iQUI a ^ . Ml Me ] t:o n a 1: I: o r 11 e y s f < D 11 
Plaintiffs, at: thei r address, City Centre I, Suite 900,- 175 East 
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 3> tl* day of *!^5^ 
, 1992. 
\4^ 
